http://www.cceia.org/resources/transcripts/0050.html#3 Questions and Answers QUESTION: I just want to ask you a little bit more about this question of political Islam. In the beginning of your remarks, I had the impression that you were saying that there was a genuine, profound schism between those who occupy the center-which is to say, secular moderates-and Islamists. But then you, towards the end, wanted to make this distinction among classes of Islamists. In terms of what this means for secular moderates in Jordan, in Egypt, in Morocco, where you have active Islamist parties which are pledged to peace, there are small numbers of political moderates who are eager to actually make common cause with what they see as increasingly democratically inclined or modernized Islamist parties, and others who think that is a fool's game. In Jordan or in Egypt, what would you say should be the relationship that the secular moderates should seek with the Islamist parties? MARWAN MUASHER: I don't believe that Islam and democracy are incompatible at all. I can only point to Turkey's example. I can point to Malaysia. I can point to many countries where Islam and democracy are coexisting extremely well. I don't mean to say that there is a schism between peaceful political Islam and secular moderates. They have different points of view, there's no question about it. The moderates tend to favor peace and coexistence. The Islamist parties, whether they are peaceful or not, are against peace, or at least against peace with the terms that we all talk about. If the two principles are adhered to-and Turkey has, I think, a useful example to emulate-if the two principles of peaceful means and commitment to political and cultural diversity are respected, it should not really matter who comes to power, if we know that that power can rotate. But if we want to go to an Iranian model, where people use democracy to come to power and then you have parallel systems-you have a state system and a religious system; you have people deciding whether you are eligible to run for office or not- that's not the model that secular moderates hope to achieve in the Arab world. My starting point is these two principles. If they are adhered to, then the state has no excuse whatsoever in keeping the system closed, as long as all parties, whether they are Islamist or not, adhere to the two principles. I know this is not an easy thing to do. I know this might take 40 or 50 years. But all I know also is that the alternative of not doing anything is not going to result in a disappearance or a weakening of religious forces. We have all seen this. We have all seen this very clearly. The more we keep the system closed, in my opinion, the more we invite the religious forces to become stronger and to take over in the region. If the Arab elite want to keep their power, they have to share it. The option of absolute power, and indefinite absolute power, is no longer a sustainable option in the Arab world. QUESTION: Now that you are with the World Bank, could you extend your discussion of reforms to economic development? What are the possibilities for greater self-determination, for more middle-class businesses, and so forth, and especially now, with the Internet, with the access that everyone can have to other ideas and other methods of supporting themselves? MARWAN MUASHER: Thank you. First of all, I need to make a qualification, which is that my talk has nothing to do with the World Bank. I'm presently on leave from the World Bank to promote the book. The World Bank cannot take any political position, something which I'm obviously doing now. Under an arrangement with the World Bank, I'm on an unpaid leave of absence to promote the book, but with the clear understanding that these are my personal views and not necessarily the views of the bank. Having said that, the issue of economic development is an extremely important issue in the Arab world today. Certainly the bank is very concerned with that. We have what is called the "youth bulge" in the Arab world, meaning that 60-to-70 percent of Arabs today are under 30 years of age-60-to-70 percent. You have huge numbers attempting to enter the workforce each year, but they are unable to do so because they are not equipped with the skills necessary for the labor market. The educational system in the Arab world or Arab governments has so far focused on the quantity of education and not on the quality of education. The Arab world has done very, very important advances in terms of eradicating illiteracy, putting people into school, closing the gender gap, et cetera. All this is truly remarkable. Most Arab countries spend more than 5 percent of their GDP on education. But the quality of education is something that very few Arab countries have done something about. The soft skills that are necessary to equip people with skills needed, such as critical thinking, problem solving, communications skills, research-all of these are not taught in any significant way in the Arab world. So far students are mostly taught what to think and not how to think. Unless the Arab world does something drastic about this, we have no hope of closing the increasing gap in knowledge, in development, and in governance that exists today between the Arab world and the rest of the world. The bank is approaching this through the lens of linking it to market needs. Anytime you talk about a change in curriculum, then people will accuse you of tampering with their cultural values. This is not just an issue of cultural values. It's an issue of existence. It's an issue of survival. I think at least some Arab governments are starting to understand that, that they cannot ignore this any longer, not because of political or cultural reasons, but because of economic reasons. That's a good start. I hope that through that angle we can at least start to seriously address the issue of educational reform in the Arab world. QUESTION: In 1948, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians fled Israel. Subsequently, hundreds of thousands of Jews fled Arab lands. It was almost an equal number. The numbers are estimated at 600,000 for each population. The difference is that those who fled Arab lands were absorbed into Israel's general population. Unfortunately for those poor souls who fled Israel, they have been, for the most part, kept in refugee camps, costing billions of dollars to maintain-American dollars and dollars from all the countries of the world who participate in that. It's a very sad story for those people. Of course, Jordan is an exception. They did accept them, and Palestinians are citizens, as I understand it, of Iran. It's a very sad thing. I wonder if you can explain it, and I wonder if you can explain how these people could in any way be repatriated. That's the number-one issue, as you outlined it earlier. MARWAN MUASHER: I will first maintain, at the risk of sounding unpopular, that in both cases-in the case of Palestinians leaving Israel and Jews leaving Arab states-they did not always flee. They were forced out, in both communities. The Palestinians were forced out. The historical record is clear on that. The Jews were also forced out. But that's history. One point I tried to make in this book is that the history of the Middle East, which is an extremely rich one, cannot define our future. If we remain embedded in this history, we will never agree to a solution-never. The history has been so far mutually exclusive. Both sides have mutually exclusive dreams. The Israelis dream of an Eretz Israel where all the land is kept. They dream of a Jerusalem which is only for the Jewish faith, et cetera. Arabs dream of the right of return and of coming back to a land and a culture that does not exist they way they left it. We cannot forge an agreement based on these mutually exclusive dreams. Fortunately, we don't have to. Fortunately, both sides, in my opinion, have come to grips with this. They have actually forged a framework to solve all of these issues, including the refugee issue, including Jerusalem, including land, including territory, including security. All of these issues have been talked about. For all of these issues solutions have been proposed. I'm being a bit dramatic here, but I'm serious. These issues have been negotiated. If you want, I'll tell you today what the solution will look like. The solution today is a Palestinian state on the basis of the 1967 border, with minor modifications to take into account settlements along the Green Line and land swaps to compensate for that elsewhere. That has been already talked about. On Jerusalem: The Arab part of Jerusalem goes back to Arab sovereignty. The Jewish part of Jerusalem stays in Israeli sovereignty. The Old City-they found a solution where the Muslim and Christian quarters and most of the Armenian quarters, with the exception of 12 houses that overlook the Western Wall, will go back to Arab sovereignty and the rest are in Israeli sovereignty. On refugees, they talked about five options: Symbolic numbers to go back to Israel as a way of closure to the conflict. That symbolic number is to be agreed with Israel. Or citizenship where they are. Or a right of return to be exercised inside the new Palestinian state, in unlimited numbers. Or repatriation to third countries-Canada, Australia, the United States, Europe, et cetera. Or repatriation to the lands that will be swapped with Israel in return for an agreement. In all cases, compensation for their losses. One of the problems today is that Palestinians are asked today to give up the right of return now, even before negotiations start. That, to them-and I, frankly, totally agree-robs them of one of the main components of a deal. It's like asking Israel to give up their right to Jerusalem before they start. You cannot do this. It has to be a comprehensive package. Without a comprehensive package, the necessary compromises will not be made. There will be compromises, and there will be painful compromises, not just on the part of the Israelis, but on the part of the Palestinians also. But the parameters are known. I also no longer believe that it is possible to come to a Palestinian-Israeli agreement, but rather a comprehensive agreement with the Arab world. If you talk about a Palestinian-Israeli agreement, then people will ask, what about Hezbollah? What about Hamas? What about Iran's support for the anti- peace forces? These are issues that will not be solved through a Palestinian- Israeli agreement. To solve them, to bring about a security regime that both Arabs and Israelis will feel comfortable with, you will have to sign an agreement with the whole Arab world. Again, fortunately, that's now possible, because the Arabs themselves have said they are ready to do so, through the Arab Peace Initiative. QUESTION: I totally agree with you that with regard to a solution between the Israelis and Palestinians, one would pull maybe three or four documents that we have negotiated with the Israeli side on all of the final status issues. Therefore, the solution is well known. What we don't have is the political will to implement it. In this regard, I wonder if you have some thoughts to share with us about why the Israeli government and the U.S. administration-why their action is helping the radicals on the Palestinian side and not helping the moderates. Thank you. MARWAN MUASHER: What is the moderates' strongest suit that they have tried to sell to the Arab public? It is the peace process. The moderates have said, "Trust us. We will bring you an equitable solution." But we have not. We have tried. I spent the last 20 years trying. We have not brought the solution, not because we did not try. I still maintain we are probably among the few who have tried. But despite that, we did not bring a solution. And because we did not even touch the other issues, we have nothing to show. We are a force of slogans to the Arab public. To the Arab public, we are a force of slogans, unable to deliver on anything. This is why the radicals are strengthened. The radicals tell the Arab public, "Look, we're not promising you peace either. But we're going to promise you social services. We're going to promise you cleaner government. We're going to promise you a fight against corruption. If these guys are not bringing you peace anyway, you might as well come with us. We at least provide you with services." And they are right. So far they are right. This is why it is so important to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict. The issue of reform-not every reform issue is related to the conflict. Women's empowerment has nothing to do with the Arab-Israeli conflict. Judicial independence has nothing to do with the Arab- Israeli conflict. So I don't want to also say that Arab moderates do not have a responsibility. They have a huge responsibility. My argument, actually, is that we are today in this situation of two-options-only largely because of the Arab moderates, largely because of the Arab seculars, because the secular parties in the Arab world, after independence, have not given this issue any attention. Today this is the situation we find ourselves in, largely because of our own doing. If we solve the Arab-Israeli conflict, we still have to deal with a lot of other issues, but at least we can argue to our people that we are starting to deliver. Unless we deliver on other issues, we will continue to be marginalized. But at least we can do that. Let me also mention this two-state solution. Many think that a two- state solution is going to go against the interests of Israel and that a two-state solution means that you are going to take some land that Israelis believe is their own. Ironically, in my opinion, Israel needs a two-state solution as much as the Palestinians do. Today you have a situation in Israel where you have about 5 million Jews. It's a country of about 6 million today, maybe 5.5 million. Five million of them are Jews and 1 million of them are Arabs. Then you add about 3.5 million Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza. Today, right now, you have a situation of 5 million Jews versus 4.5 million Arabs. If Israel does not go for a two-state solution, and soon, you will very soon, in a few years, find yourself in a situation where the Arabs in prehistoric Palestine outnumber the Jews. And then what do you do? If you are Israel, what do you do? If you don't want a two- state solution, you either opt for a one-state solution-you say everybody is a citizen, which we also know is a formula for disaster for Israel, and it will never do that-or you opt to indefinitely have an occupation, which is another formula for disaster. We are in the 21st century. This is the longest occupation of the 20th and 21st centuries. If Israel does not opt for a two-state solution, it will find itself in very dire straits, and soon. Prime Minister Rabin understood this. A few years before he died, he started talking about the "Palestinian entity," as he called it at the time. Prime Minister Olmert and Prime Minister Sharon belatedly understood it, in the beginning of this decade, but so far are working for a Palestinian state that addresses Israeli needs. That's not a formula for a successful agreement. You need to work for a state that addresses both needs, including the Palestinian needs. Unless you have a viable Palestinian state, we are also not going to solve the conflict. QUESTION: I'm getting a sense that an increasing amount of the population of Israel is giving up the idea of a peace process all together. I think the concept is that the economies of Israel and the Palestinians are going in opposite directions. The Israeli economy is booming and the Palestinian economy is imploding. The concept, I think, that the Israelis are finding themselves in is that they do not want to empower, by giving statehood, a society that has no economic center and is inherently more dangerous as a state, with all the powers of a state. I just wonder whether or not the efforts of the moderates in the Arab world should not be directed first at helping the Palestinians develop their economy, which seems to be an effort that is totally lacking, rather than focusing on a political solution between Israel and the Palestinians. MARWAN MUASHER: It's interesting to note-and I will quote the World Bank-that the World Bank today is very reluctant-forget the Arabs-to pump money into the Palestinian territories. The European Union is very reluctant to pump new money into the Palestinian territories. The argument that both the World Bank and the European Union are advancing is that with checkpoints, with a Swiss cheese type of entity, how can you ever hope to have an economic center? If you cannot export your products, if you don't have free movement of labor and goods within your own territory, how can you ever hope to develop an economic center? Six hundred and fifty checkpoints in the West Bank-650 checkpoints. If you want to go from here to, say, the United Nations building, it might take you two days-two days. There is no way you can develop an economic center under these conditions. The continuation of the conflict and the occupation is what is causing this, and not the opposite. The two are linked very, very strongly. You cannot talk about economic development under such conditions. It has been tried. It has been tried under occupation. Mr. Wolfensohn and the World Bank during his days, the European Union, American aid-it has all been tried, and Arab aid as well. It's not working. It's just pumping bad money after good, or whatever. It's not resulting in anything, because of this, I'm sorry to say, strangulation of the West Bank. JOANNE MYERS: I'm sorry, our time is up. I thank you so much for presenting these issues in such a balanced way. Thank you.