fri 8:20p hou/sat 3:20a krak yeah, terrrrific stuff. real page-turners. thanx loads. um, just for academic grins, would you gents mind awfully distinguishing between hegemonic + non-hegemonic neo-liberalism? is one more dreaded than the other? given the practical problems + challenges of life in zimbab--and on the continent, generally--can either of you great minds establish that there is a single african alive who could possibly care or who has really ever cared? just wondering. note for nalini + uncle sidney: the zeltzer + wanzala exchange is a prima facie example of why pacifica is among the most yawningly boring groups of in-bred pinheads in any hemisphere. you should have less trouble than you think taking them out. good luck with your endeavor. gg Joseph Wanzala wrote: >Thanks for sending this Steve. Terrific stuff. It certainly puts the >current crisis in Zimbabwe, and Africa, in perspective and shows how >sublimely hypocritical the stance of the West and the 'international >community' is. In fact, it has major bearing for contemporary leftist >thought in general, in the face of non-hegemonic neo-liberalism. > >Joe W. > > >---------- Forwarded message ---------- >From: Steve Zeltzer <lvpsf@xxxxxxx> >Date: Fri, Jun 27, 2008 at 9:57 AM >Subject: Flashback 1980: What Future for Zimbabwe Now? >To: Joe Wanzala <wanzala@xxxxxxxxx> > > > >http://www.labournet.net/world/0806/zimbab4.html > >This article from late 1980 shows that even in the midst of general >euphoria at the collapse of Ian Smith's Rhodesia there was plenty of >evidence on how things might develop under Mugabe, for those willing >to look. The authors were active in the Anti-Apartheid movement. It >was first published in Revolutionary Socialism no. 6, Winter 1980-81, >the magazine of the libertarian communist organisation Big Flame >[gone, but not forgotten!]. It is reprinted with the original >introduction by the editors. > >Often the left tends to ignore the detail of the developing situation >after a successful anti-imperialist struggle – it's far more >straightforward to be in solidarity with a struggle whilst it is still >directly fighting imperialism. Once a struggle has succeeded in its >immediate task it is difficult to balance a critical socialist >analysis with an understanding of what is possible for a new regime to >achieve in often unfavourable political and economic circumstances. > >Recently Big Flame published a pamphlet (The Century of the >Unexpected) which suggested that under-developed countries, if they >tried to break from imperialism and capitalism, would most likely >develop along a path called "state collectivism", where the laws of >the market are eliminated or minimized and a new ruling class would be >formed, not based on the ownership of capital and the means of >production but on the control of the state (and often the party) >apparatus. The accuracy of this is a matter for debate inside Big >Flame. It provides the wider context in which the analysis of recent >developments in Zimbabwe can be placed. > >To analyse the way a national situation is developing we need, as well >as an overall political method, an accurate understanding of the >situation on the ground. This article, which is written by three >members of Big Flame's Southern Africa Group, is based on detailed >first-hand reports on the events in Zimbabwe since the Mugabe regime >came to power. If the analysis leads to what may seem as a somewhat >pessimistic, premature judgement, it is as well to remember that other >successful anti-imperialist struggles have also gone on to develop in >ways socialists would not have wanted. > >The situation in Zimbabwe is particularly important for us in Britain >because of the historical, and continuing, involvement of British >imperialism. Of still wider importance are the implications of >Zimbabwe to a reading of the current balance of forces in Southern >Africa, particularly South Africa. The authors' interest stems from >the involvement in Southern Africa solidarity work and the need to >make the difficult balance of combining continuing opposition to >imperialism with a critical stance towards policy of the new regime >which may be against the interests of the Zimbabwean masses. > >________________________________ > >"We recognise that the economic structure of the country is based on >capitalism and whatever ideas we have must build on that. Modification >can only take place in a gradual way." (Mugabe, March 1980) > >"We believe we are going through a national democratic revolution >whereby the institutions, the society has to be democratised. This is >a national democratic phase, but it is also a transition to >socialism... we envisage a socialist society in the final >analysis."(Kangai, Minister of Labour, March 1980) > >ZANU came to power in March 1980, after 19 years of struggle, 8 years >of intensive armed struggle, and after a stunning election victory in >which ZANU and ZAPU between them received 87% of the votes cast and >gained 77 of the 80 seats reserved for non-whites. A Government was >formed including ZAPU and two members of the white Rhodesian Front, >but ZANU's strength was such that it commanded effective power, at >least within the structures that prevailed. > >Nevertheless, as the above quotations indicate, the victory of the >liberation movement in Zimbabwe was different from that of Frelimo in >Mozambique or MPLA in Angola. Whereas the latter came to power by >smashing the 'settler capitalist' state apparatus (1), ZANU and ZAPU >inherited, despite the years of struggle, a settler state that was >still largely intact. > >This inevitably poses a host of problems for the liberation movement. >Can they keep the struggle going and move towards a socialist Zimbabwe >by whittling away and replacing the oppressive and racist state >apparatuses? Or are they restricted to limited power within the >existing state, able only to assist a transformation which white >settler colonialism to neo-colonialism? > >Limited victory > >Mugabe's victory in the Zimbabwean election in March 1980 was truly >overwhelming, reflecting widespread support, in both town and country, >for the liberation movement. (2)Nevertheless, we do not fully accept >the Anti-Apartheid view of the victory, which is that the 'Black >carpet' has rolled further south, leaving only Namibia and South >Africa to be liberated. The sad truth is that there has been a >substantial rollback at the same time as an advance. This rollback has >left the economies of Mozambique, Angola and Zambia in crisis, trapped >the new Zimbabwean Government at birth, and furthered the domination >of South Africa – and imperialism – over the region as a whole. The >advance has been perhaps less in Zimbabwe (as yet) and more in South >Africa, where the euphoria over Zimbabwean independence led to the >first ever combination of a strike wave, student struggles and an >intensification of armed confrontation (the Sasol bombings) [SASOL was >the state oil-from-coal plant, designed to evade sanctions. It was >bombed by the ANC]. Our excitement over such positive developments >should not blind us to the fact that many of the problems of South >African liberation remain far from resolution. > >Workers v. the Government > >ZANU's election victory gave it power in a state still very much >dominated by foreign multinationals. Around 70% of capital in Zimbabwe >is foreign investment, half of that being British (including Dunlop, >Lonrho, Turner and Newall, RTZ, Unilever, BAT, Barclays) and one-third >South African (Anglo-American Corp. being the most notable). The >foreign companies control manufacturing and agricultural production >for the domestic and African markets; and asbestos, gold, chrome, >nickel, copper and coal production (among others) for the world >market. As the economist Duncan Clarke has written: > >"It is hard to find a sub-Saharan African example comparable to the >Zimbabwean case, in which the role of foreign investment has been so >long established, as deeply integrated into the sectors producing the >bulk of output, so strongly interconnected with local capital, and in >consequence probably as difficult to foresee being quickly and >successfully altered." (3) > >Living standards? > >Of the 7 million Africans in Zimbabwe, only one million are in waged >work. Unemployment is growing with the return of more than a million >people displaced by the war and the addition of school leavers and >demobilised guerrillas. The unemployed depend on peasant production, >the extended family network in the tribal trust lands, and >increasingly, such activities as moonlighting, petty theft, petty >trading, etc. Most Africans who are employed are attempting to support >large families on wages of less than the Poverty Datum line level >(around £70 a month). The average wage on the large white-owned farms >is about £15 a month, which means a monthly income per person of less >than £3 a month. (Government figures, Sept. 1980). > >The racist work set-up which survived from the UDI period meant that >Africans, with 96% of the population, had only 20% of apprentices. >Promotion, even for skilled workers, was more or less blocked; white >supervisors meant constant harassment and abuse; scarce attention was >paid to health and safety, so that workers in asbestos mines, for >example, worked unprotected, with many getting asbestosis; hours were >long and work arduous and often back-breaking; where unions existed, >they were bureaucratic, closer to management than the workforce, and >often in league with the reactionary Western union body, the ICFTU; >and if strikes occurred, most were illegal under an Industrial >Conciliation Act which gave workers no protection against dismissal >and gave the police and the army every opportunity to come in as >strike-breakers. > >The fact that workers played little direct part in the liberation >struggle has often been held against them, not least during the >post-election strike-wave. The other side of the coin, however, is >that only ZAPU ever had an orientation towards the workers that was >anything more than rhetorical and that, even though many of the >workers were relations of those waging the war in the rural areas, few >genuine attempts were made to draw the links. > >Strike Wave > >The explosion of strikes and other forms of action immediately after >the February elections did not, it is true, reflect any sort of >revolutionary working class consciousness. But it did reflect years of >pent up anger and frustration. The Government did not support the >strikers for a moment. It evidently decided that Zimbabwe's future >well-being required, for now, enough concessions to foreign companies >to keep them deeply entrenched in the Zimbabwean economy. While >workers were fobbed off with a £40/month minimum wage, Mugabe extolled >the virtues of private enterprise. And there was the unbelievable >sight of the crack Rhodesian army unit, the Rhodesian African Rifles, >being sent in against strikers at the Wankie coke plant. > >But what was the position lower down the ranks of the ZANU hierarchy? >What happened when ZANU members confronted the strikers? After all, we >cannot base our assessment simply on statements made to the Western >press. (4) > >The strikes took different forms: some were against racist abuse by >white supervisors; others were for wage demands of up to 400% (on an >average industrial wage of £10 a week); others were for both. With the >strikes against racist supervisors, the Government was usually willing >to put pressure on an employer to remove a supervisor who would not >change his attitude. But low wages were another story. > >With big strikes, Kangai, the Minister of Labour, would intervene; >with small strikes, lower ranking labour officials would be sent in. >Workers would be told to end their action because a) they were >privileged in relation to the many people who had no job, especially >people who had suffered, for example, in protected villages; b) a >strike would not help other workers in the industry, and c) wages >would be going up when the new minimum wage was introduced. They were >told that if they wouldn't go back to work they would lose their jobs >– and we have heard of a few instances where this actually occurred. >(5) > >Workers' committees > >A hopeful sign that the relationship between workers and the >Government may improve was the latter's encouragement for workers' >committees. These would operate at a shop steward level, replacing the >'business unions' of the Smith regime and negotiating with the >Government either directly or via a new central union body, the >Zimbabwean Congress of Trade Unions. They would fulfil the workers' >need for a representative body and the Government's need for >formalised structures. > >But any illusions disappeared when the Government proved incapable of >reconciling its commitment to change with its fear of challenging the >status quo. Thus those members of workers' committees who opposed >Government policies were victimised and/or sacked, and those who were >conciliatory were rewarded with managerial or supervisory jobs. The >discussions on a new minimum wage involved no workers' representatives >– instead industrialists and members of the Chamber of Commerce and >the white Farmers' Union were invited to talks with the Cabinet and >the ZANU Central Committee. > >Discussions on the formation of the Zimbabwe TUC involved Trade Union >officials from the old regime, ZANU Party nominees (chosen by the >Government) and delegates from the American AFL-CIO and the notorious >ICFTU. And while everyone was expecting a new law to replace the >anti-strike, corporatist Industrial Conciliation Act of the Smith era, >Kangai was informing an international gathering in Salisbury >(organised by the ICFTU) that: > >"I firmly believe that the regulated system of labour relations that >we in Zimbabwe have (the Industrial Conciliation Act) is more >beneficial for the community as a whole rather than the 'dog-eat-dog' >industrial philosophy of the so-called free labour movement which >operates in some countries held to be more developed than our own." > >Fear > >The only conclusion that can be drawn from the above – selected from >many similar examples – is that the new Government has a basic fear of >spontaneity and self-activity. Its concern for workers' committees and >workers' participation is no more than a concern for regulation, under >state and capitalist control, of workers' demands. The talk is always >of one nation, as in Mugabe's statement that "now is the time for >reconciliation, reconstruction and nation-building. Let us set aside >our differences once and for all and pull together." > >Yet Zimbabwe is very far from one nation. Oppressive, racist >structures prevail and will continue as long as 'differences are put >aside'. For workers, this means no change in all the oppressive >working conditions mentioned earlier. As regards the multinationals, >so strong in Zimbabwe, it means no change in the Government policy – >concessions, combined with haggling over the percentage of profits >that can be taken out of the country. The multinationals retain their >hold over the economy, blocking any transition away from a system of >high unemployment, high levels of foreign debt, bad wages and working >conditions, etc. > >Rural areas: devastation and democracy > >The people who suffered most in the struggle for national liberation >were the masses of peasants, largely from the Tribal Trust Lands, who >provided the guerrillas, the mujibas (6)and so many others who >confronted the white settler state. > >The war hurt the rural poor in a number of ways: Operation Turkey >destroyed crops, granaries, cattle and other basic means of >livelihood; the herding of peasants into protected villages left much >peasant land untended for long periods; the destruction of cattle dips >– by both the guerrillas and the Whites – allowed disease to devastate >the cattle population; and the destruction of villages by the >Rhodesian Army left many people homeless and destitute. Many people >faced daily coercion from either the Rhodesian Army or Muzorewa's or >Sithole's 'auxiliaries'; the numbers suffering from malnutrition rose, >as did the numbers dying from disease. (7) > >Meanwhile, the white farmers continued to exploit a large army of >Black agricultural labourers who produce, on the white-owned farms, >the bulk of Zimbabwe's agricultural goods. Although production levels >fell off a little in the last period of the war, State-guaranteed >prices ensured high profits for a privileged elite who constituted a >core element of the white-settler state. (8) > >Government policy > >What has been the policy of the new Government? Most surprising >perhaps has been ZANU's commitment to maintaining the white farming >sector, and this despite the wartime rhetoric which talked of all the >land belonging to the Africans being expropriated from those who stole >it from its rightful owners by force of arms. > >The new Government began by appointing Dennis Norman, former President >of the reactionary Commercial Farmers' Union, as Minister of >Agriculture. This signalled that ZANU had no intention of violating >the provisions of the Lancaster House agreement which prohibited any >expropriations of white land without compensation. Instead, the >Government would encourage 'efficient' white farmers (i. e. those >whose African labourers were most productive) and gradually buy up the >land of less efficient farmers, in order to redistribute it to >landless peasants and returning refugees. There is vague talk of >workers' participation on the white farms, but there have been no >indications of how the white farmers will be persuaded to accept this, >or whether it will do anything to change the racist hierarchy on the >farms. > >The Government strategy with regard to the small plots of the African >population is equally vague. Though there is talk of improving >productivity by uniting family units of land into a larger >cooperative, in which the peasants will manage their own affairs on a >collective basis, there are few signs of this being put into practice >in a way that accords with the peasants' own view of what is best. >Many peasants have moved beyond a reactionary, tribalist perspective, >having participated for years in this war, and their views on how a >cooperative should be run ought to be taken into consideration. (9) > >Unfortunately, in many parts of the country the talk is not at all of >cooperatives but of basic survival. Lacking cattle, large numbers of >peasants are unable to plough their land for next year's crops and >they have no crops from last year because they were locked up in >'protected villages'. There is a desperate need for food now and seeds >for the next harvest. > >In so far as the national liberation struggle was largely about land, >the present situation is disastrous – whole structures remain to be >changed. It would seem to be crucial for the Government to support >those who have been radicalised by the struggle, and who try >constructively to change things. Yet the Government has failed to >support peasants who have occupied white land, even if it was not >being efficiently used. Likewise, they seem to be conflicting with a >number of village committees, even though these are in many ways the >most democratic form of institution to come out of the liberation >struggle. > >Village committees > >The village committees are the governing bodies at the local level, >though some administration is still carried out by the District >Commissioners of the settler state. There are officers on the village >committees for all aspects of local life, including education, health, >social welfare and agriculture, and generally the officers carry out >the same function as they did on the base committees during the war. > >The base committees had replaced the structures of the local state in >those areas where ZANLA (or ZIPRA in the West) had effective control. >They were elected by the people and worked in their interests, at the >same time as working closely with the liberation movement. Because the >village committees are direct descendants of the base committees, they >retain the trust and confidence of the people. At ground level, they >are one of the most democratic structures in the new state. > >But they are not independent bodies. They clash regularly with the >District Commissioners(10) and they also have to answer to the >hierarchy of committees above them. For their are a number of levels >of committee, from village through branch, district and region to the >central committee, and all decisions of import have to be ratified at >the level above. While this allows the Party to keep in touch with the >people at a local level, it is also a way of keeping control – and >there have been a number of clashes between ZANU and the village >committees over decisions taken. > >The October elections replaced the village committees and the District >Commissioners with District Councils, which combine all political and >administrative functions. This won't necessarily mean an end to local >democracy, but there will be a struggle over the degree of autonomy >that the new bodies should be allowed. At the same time there will be >more tension between ZANU and ZAPU, with the latter trying to >capitalise on the growing disenchantment with the post-Independence >developments. The outcome of these two overlapping confrontations will >go a long way towards determining other developments over the next few >years. > >Women > >Women have always played an important role in Zimbabwean society, and >an equally important role in the struggle for liberation. Back in the >1890's, a woman spirit medium, Nehanda, played an inspiring part in >the first struggle against the British settlers before being hanged in >1898. Nevertheless, many patriarchal traditions survived, others were >even enhanced by the period of settler rule, and it was only in the >war of the 1970's that women began, on a large scale, to fight for >liberation. In fact, the gains of ZANU and ZAPU would not have been >possible without the organisational role of women in the villages, the >bravery of the women guerrillas, the role of girls as message bearers, >the provision of food by women and the work of women as nurses and >teachers in the guerrilla camps. > >Sadly, but all too characteristically, the struggle has brought women >few benefits. Already, as the elections approached, ZANU women lost >their fight for a representative number of women candidates (they were >allowed only a handful). Soon after the elections, market women >organised a demonstration against white police harassment, only to see >the new Government send in the anti-riot squad against them. > >On a positive note, the Government has undertaken at some point to >introduce equal pay for equal work, thus replacing the Rhodesian >regulation by which women received between 56% and 67% of the man's >pay for the same work. Nevertheless, there are still no maternity >benefits, women are still demoted following maternity leave (max. 3 >months), and women are generally excluded from union politics. > >And, as the vast majority of women are not in waged employment, there >is a vital need to change the situation in the rural areas. Here >unmarried women cannot own land, widows are often deprived of it, >women do most of the work for the tiniest wage, and there is still far >too little land to adequately feed the families. As has been said, >there will be no women's liberation without a revolution on the land. > >Perhaps things will change, and certainly there must be some spillover >from the fantastic level of commitment, and the energy and the gallons >of blood that women gave to the struggle. But it is not heartening to >find one of Zimbabwe's two women Government Ministers, and a long-time >guerrilla, saying the following: > >"The purpose of the war was to eliminate a system. Now that it has >been eliminated, there is no need for people to be divided. Women have >a great role to play in uniting the nation because they are household >builders, mothers of the future generations and wives to the rulers... >Women should get equal pay with men so that they can hire people to >help them with the housework." (11) > >Assembly points > >The guerrillas live in the assembly camps in quite appalling >conditions. Food supplies are inadequate, water often has to be >transported to the remote camps from far away. Daily life is extremely >routine, with neither practical nor political education. Many of the >occupants are young teenagers, probably mujibas who were sent as >substitutes for guerrillas as a precaution against treachery during >the ceasefire. It would also have been important to keep guerrillas in >the villages to act as election officers for ZANU (or ZAPU). > >The Government has tried to resolve the guerrilla predicament in three >ways. The first, unification of the armies, has foundered on >sectarianism and an understandable cynicism with regard to the >Rhodesian Army's trustworthiness. It now seems further away than ever, >but, even if achieved, it will only take up one third to a half of the >32, 500 guerrillas. > >Operation Seed, the Government programme whereby guerrillas from the >camps help out in some of the worst hit agricultural areas, has barely >begun, and there have been several reports of guerrillas absconding >because of disenchantment with the scheme. Finally, there is the >attempt to move guerrillas to one of the townships outside Salisbury, >which has inevitably provoked resistance from the people affected and >which does nothing, anyway, to resolve the dilemma over the >guerrillas' future. > >Most of the guerrillas want a career in the Army, if only because it >offers good pay and job security in a country with high levels of >unemployment. (12) More and more guerrillas, however, are simply >leaving the camps, sometimes smuggling their guns out with them. >Either they are dissatisfied with the camp regime, or with the >policies of the Government they brought to power. The latter tend, it >seems, to return to the areas they fought in, in order to take up the >struggle again in some form. Others resort to banditry, or individual >acts of frustrated anger. > >Government conflicts > >The direction the new Government has taken has inevitably provoked >open dissent. In particular, ZAPU has tried to capitalise on some of >ZANU's more obvious policy weaknesses, especially in the run-up to the >municipal elections in November 1980. With ZANU trying to counter this >with its own sectarianism, conflicts became inevitable. The Bulawayo >tragedy, when over 40 people died, was neither the first nor the last >incident to arise from these tensions. > >But the wider tensions in Zimbabwean society manifest themselves >within ZANU too, right up to ministerial level. One of the most vocal >dissenters was Edgar Tekere, Minister for Manpower and Development and >Secretary-General of ZANU. > >Tekere's politics, like those who are close to him including >Shamuyarira, Minister of Information, are militantly nationalist, in >the sense of favouring Africanisation of state institutions, >nationalisation of certain key industries, and moves to challenge the >power of the white farmers. His militancy, and his populist appeal, >can be seen in the following statement in an interview in July: > >"It is natural for the people, after... losing so many lives, to >expect change as soon as we come in. The people expect it from those >who behaved and acted like revolutionaries for all those years. So the >revolution continues, a luta continua, this is what the people are >saying." > >The direction of the new Government must, then, remain flexible. It >will not be allowed to stop at a few measures here, a few measures >there. Pressures will grow, whether from within the Party or outside, >forcing the ZANU leadership to decide between either widespread >conflict with ZAPU, striking workers and militant peasants, or a major >reassessment of the direction it is taking. > >History > >Looking at the history of the liberation movement, of ZANU and ZAPU >(13), there is a remarkable degree of continuity between the early >years – when ZAPU was still the ANC – and the later years, when large >guerrilla armies were occupying substantial areas of Zimbabwe. > >Of course, continuity is only part of the picture. It could be >forcefully argued that the development of the movement is >characterised far more by change, leadership struggles, radicalisation >of the grass roots, new alliances overseas etc. Yet the point is that >the changes are obvious, while the continuity tends to be ignored. And >the continuity not only completes the picture, it alters its general >complexion. > >Commentators have pointed to the intellectual background of the >leadership of ZANU and ZAPU. This would be unimportant if there wasn't >also a tendency to be elitist, to generally distrust the spontaneity >and intelligence of the masses. This tendency both feeds and feeds off >the hierarchical structures of the organisations, and is revealed in >the Government's attitude during the strikes, its expressed opposition >to spontaneous land occupations by landless peasants, and its >rejection, to date, of alternative proposals for collectivisation of >peasant land. It is a tendency that can be traced back through the >movement, through the disciplining of various factions and perhaps to >the ZANU-ZAPU split itself. It raises problems at the same time: if a >war of liberation cannot be fought without hierarchical forms of >organisation – which it cannot – how can the negative effects of this >on the post-war period be controlled, if at all? > >Neo-colonialism or beyond? > >If a pragmatic socialist Party is to change things over time, as ZANU >intends, it must be aware of not only the limitations of its room for >manoeuvre, but also the dangers of itself becoming integrated into the >structures it sought to overthrow. > >Take for example the deceptively glib ZANU Manifesto statement that >'private enterprise will have to continue until circumstances are ripe >for socialist change. ' Who, for example, will develop the capitalist >economy to ripeness if not the ZANU Government? Who will assist in >this if not multinationals and Western Governments? How will >Zimbabwean capitalism become 'ripe' without emphasising productivity >and efficiency, thus weakening the position of workers? How will ZANU >decide when conditions are 'ripe for socialist change'? And how will >it avoid developing a vested interest in the status quo before then? > >ZANU is walking a difficult tightrope and one which is being >repeatedly shaken – workers striking in mid-1980 and likely to do so >again in early -81; peasants threatening to explode over the land >question; guerrillas furious over their treatment, then provoking >reaction from local residents when the Government tries to move them >to a Salisbury township; rank-and-file ZANU members challenging >Government policy in the village committees and rural collectives. > >The tightrope appears to be between some kind of neo-colonial Zimbabwe >and a socialist Zimbabwe. Yet somehow a socialist Zimbabwe seems >frustratingly elusive, while neo-colonialism appears in so many ways >inescapable. Many of the social forces putting pressure on the >Government (whether workers, peasants, women or guerrillas) are >essentially progressive, but they lack cohesion. In stark contrast, >the forces of reaction (white farmers, multinationals, police etc.) >are cohesive, strong and, in the case of multinationals, have >international backing. > >The only way the Government will be able to confront the danger of >neo-colonialism is by taking a lead in mobilising all progressive >forces in a clear anti-imperialist direction. Now is perhaps not the >time for this – the gains won remain to fragile – but the Government >must soon indicate that it is moving in such a direction or the >possibility of mobilisation could be lost, perhaps irrevocably. (14) > >Lessons > >In this article, we have written critically about several aspects of >the new Zimbabwe. But what right have we, as socialists in Britain, to >make these criticisms? > >We have tried to indicate that imperialism – mainly British – set the >conditions in which the struggle for national liberation was fought. >As we oppose British imperialism – which oppresses us here too, in a >different form – we worked in solidarity with those forces, ZANU and >ZAPU, which were most effectively confronting it. But this never >implied a blind acceptance of every position taken by the Patriotic >Front, not least because in our solidarity work we have to take into >account (1) the need to mobilise all progressive forces, including >workers, feminists, gays and Black activists, and (2) the fact that we >will be confronting imperialism all over, not only in Zimbabwe. > >So we did not support the use of British troops to implement the >ceasefire and election process. We know the reactionary nature of >British troops too well. And now, if Zimbabwean workers are organising >in British and other foreign-owned multinationals, we encourage >support from British workers and solidarity activists, whether or not >the Zimbabwean Government supports them. > >Future of solidarity work > >The time is past when we can use "anti-imperialism" as a three-line >whip for all progressives to attend demonstrations, pickets etc. We >have seen too many 'anti-imperialists' oppose the demands of women, >gays, and often workers too (e. g. in Iran). If solidarity work is to >retain any credibility in the 1980's it must address itself more >consistently to liberation as a whole. We do this effectively not by >posing maximum, all-or-nothing demands, though, but by always pressing >that bit further, by raising and pushing feminism, socialism, >democracy whenever relevant or possible, by considered and comradely >criticism, by self-criticism, by appropriate actions of solidarity (e. >g. with women as well as men in struggle.) > >So we support the Zimbabwean Government, and we remain enthused by the >massive election victory that brought it to power. But we also support >those who, by their actions and their links with the oppressed, take >the struggle forward. For, to repeat Tekere's comment: "The people >expect (change) from those who behaved and acted like revolutionaries >for all those years. So the revolution continues, a luta continua, >this is what the people are saying." > >This article is the product of a long period of collective work and >discussion by the BF Southern Africa Group. We are indebted to the >Zimbabwean Information Group, three members of which have visited >Zimbabwe since Independence and reported back, and without which this >article would not have been possible. We also thank the many >Zimbabweans who have provided information and analysis. > >Notes > >1. The Mozambicans and Angolans did have the advantage, in this >respect, that the European settlers left en masse. The statement here >is not intended to suggest that the Zimbabwean struggle was inferior >in some way, nor to suggest that Frelimo and the MPLA had no problems >in taking power. In fact, their difficulties have worsened over time. > >2. We should not exaggerate the political content of this support. >Many election observers in the rural areas, including some sympathetic >to the liberation movement, reported a universal desire for peace. >People voted for liberation, but in large part their vote was a vote >for the parties they knew could end the war. > >3. D. G. Clarke, Foreign Companies and International Investment in Zimbabwe. > >4. What follows here is based on an interview with a ZANU official in >the Ministry of Labour, interviews with strikers and trade union >leaders, and reports in the Zimbabwean press. > >5. In one case, for example, a strike at Swift Transport in June 1980, >half of the 1500 workers were dismissed for striking, despite the >formation of workers' committees. > >6. Mujibas were boys of less than fighting age who carried messages >between guerrilla units, supplies to the guerrillas from villages etc. > >7. An Oxfam survey in selected areas in the summer of 1980 found 40% >of children aged 1-5 malnourished, and 15% severely malnourished. >Common diseases include scabies, malaria and measles (often fatal for >under-nourished children). > >8. The following figures indicate the scale of the land problem, and >the desperate need for change: > >Africans and Europeans have the same amount of land (45 million acres) >but there are 100 times more African cultivators. >There is enough African arable land for 275, 000 cultivators, yet >there are 675, 000 of them which means overuse, low yield, ecological >decay, impoverishment. The result is a steady stream of cheap labour >to the towns and the European farms. And discontent. >Of the 9 million acres of arable land in the European areas, 1. 4 >million is cultivated. Many of the 6, 700 European farms require >Government subsidies to survive. Others are vast, are owned by >multinational companies, and yield huge profits. Little of their >produce is consumed by Zimbabweans. >In 1975, 88% of African farm workers earned less than £15 a month > >(source for most figures Roger Riddell, The Land Question (publ. CIIR) > >9. The Sunday Times of August 3 1980 reported resistance to Government >land policies from "former guerrillas among the tribesmen (who) have >their own ideas about farm collectives and resent officials imposing >their authority in villages where guerrilla influence has prevailed >since the ceasefire last year". Similar reports have appeared in the >Zimbabwean press. > >10. The Rhodesian District Commissioners retained certain >administrative functions but their role was not clearly defined until >their demise at the end of 1980. > >11. This quote is taken from the pamphlet Black women in Zimbabwe, >published by War on Want. > >12. Guerrillas earn £70 per month at present, well above the basic >industrial wage. > >13. This section is a much shortened version of a document we produced >for the Leeds Conference on Zimbabwe in July 1980. > >14. In Autumn 1980, the Government threatened to take over land >without compensation (its first threatened violation of the Lancaster >House Agreement) and to take over the press. While this clearly >reflects the growing pressure on the Government from its grass roots >supporters and other social forces, it is a positive sign which may >belie the more pessimistic elements of our conclusion. > >------------------------------------ > >New Pacifica Working Group >http://www.egroups.com/group/NewPacifica >'Save Our Stations!'Yahoo! Groups Links > > > > > > > ------------------------------------ New Pacifica Working Group http://www.egroups.com/group/NewPacifica 'Save Our Stations!'Yahoo! Groups Links <*> To visit your group on the web, go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/NewPacifica/ <*> Your email settings: Individual Email | Traditional <*> To change settings online go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/NewPacifica/join (Yahoo! 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